Eight to Late

Sensemaking and Analytics for Organizations

Archive for the ‘Project Management’ Category

Conversations and commitments: an encounter with emergent design 

leave a comment »

Many years ago, I was tasked with setting up an Asia-based IT development hub for a large multinational.   I knew nothing about setting up a new organisation from scratch. It therefore seemed prudent to take the conventional route – i.e., engage experts to help.

I had conversations with several well-known consulting firms. They exuded an aura of confidence-inspiring competence and presented detailed plans about how they would go about it. Moreover, they quoted costs that sounded very reasonable.  

It was very tempting to outsource the problem.

–x–

Expert-centric approaches to building new technical capabilities are liable to fail because such initiatives often display characteristics of wicked problems,  problems that are so complex and multifaceted that they are difficult to formulate clearly, let alone solve. This is because different stakeholder groups have different perspectives on what needs to be done and how it should be done.

The most important feature of such initiatives is that they cannot be tackled using rational methods of planning, design and implementation that are taught in schools, propagated in books, and evangelized by standards authorities and snake oil salespeople big consulting firms.

This points to a broader truth that technical initiatives are never purely technical; they invariably have a social dimension. It is therefore more appropriate to refer to them as sociotechnical problems.

–x–

One day, not long after my conversations with the consulting firms, I came across an article on Oliver Williamson’s Nobel prize winning work on transaction costs. The arguments presented therein drew my attention to the hidden costs of outsourcing.

The consultants I’d spoken with had included only upfront costs, neglecting the costs of coordination, communication, and rework. The outsourcing option would be cost effective only if the scale was large enough. The catch was that setting up a large development centre from scratch would be risky, both politically and financially. There was too much that could go wrong.

–x–

Building a new sociotechnical capability is a process of organisational learning. But learning itself is a process of trial and error, which is why planned approaches to building such capabilities tend to fail. 

All such initiatives are riddled with internal tensions that must be resolved before any progress can be made. To resolve these tensions successfully one needs to use an approach that respects the existing state of the organisation and introduces changes in an evolutionary manner that enables learning while involving those who will be affected by the change.  Following David Cavallo, who used such an approach in creating innovative educational interventions in Thailand, I call this process emergent design.

–x–

The mistake in my thinking was related to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. I had been thinking about the development hub as a well-defined entity rather than an idea that needed to fleshed out through a process of trial and error. This process would take time; it had to unfold in small steps, through many interactions and conversations.

It became clear to me that it would be safest to start quietly, without drawing much attention to what I was doing. That would enable me to test assumptions, gauge the organisation’s appetite for the change and, most importantly, learn by trial and error.

I felt an opportunity would present itself sooner than later.

–x–

In their book, Disclosing New Worlds, which I have discussed at length in this post, Spinosa et. al. note that:

“[organisational] work [is] a matter of coordinating human activity – opening up conversations about one thing or another to produce a binding promise to perform an act … Work never appears in isolation but always in a context created by conversation.”

John Shotter and Ann Cunliffe flesh out the importance of conversations via their notion of managers as authors [of organisational reality].  Literally, managers create (or author) realities through conversations that help people make sense of ambiguous situations and / or open up new possibilities.

Indeed, conversations are the lifeblood of organisations. It is through conversations that the myriad interactions in organisational life are transformed into commitments and thence into actions.

–x–

A few weeks later, a work colleague located in Europe called to catch up. We knew each other well from a project we had worked on a few years earlier. During the conversation, he complained about how hard it was to find database skills at a reasonable cost.

My antennae went up. I asked him what he considered to be a “reasonable cost.” The number he quoted was considerably more than one would pay for those skills at my location.  

“I think I can help you,” I said, “I can find you a developer for at most two thirds that cost here. Would you like to try that out for six months and see how it works?” 

“That’s very tempting,” he replied after a pause, “but it won’t work. What about equipment, workspace etc.? More important, what about approvals.” 

“I’ll sort out the workspace and equipment,” I replied, “and I’ll charge it back to your cost centre. As for the approval, let’s just keep this to ourselves for now. I’ll take the rap if there’s trouble later.” 

He laughed over the line. “I don’t think anyone will complain if this works. Let’s do it!” 

–x–

As Shotter and Cunliffe put it, management is about acting in relationally responsive ways. Seen in that light, conversations are more than just talk; they are about creating shared realities that lead to action.

How can one behave in a relationally responsive way? As in all situations involving human beings, there are no formulas, but there are some guiding principles that I have found useful in my own work as a manager and consultant:

Be a midwife rather than an expert:  The first guideline is to realize that no one is an expert – not you nor your Big $$$ consultant. True expertise comes from collaborative action.  The role of the midwife is to create and foster the conditions for collaborative action to occur.  

Act first, seek permission later (but exercise common sense): Many organisations have a long list of dos and don’ts. A useful guideline to keep in mind is that it is usually OK to launch exploratory actions as long as they are done in good faith, the benefits are demonstrable and, most importantly, the actions do not violate ethical principles. The dictum that it is easier to beg forgiveness than seek permission has a good deal of truth to it. However, you will need to think about the downsides of acting without permission in the context of your organisation, its tolerance for risk and the relationships you have with management.

Do not penalize people for learning:  when setting up new capabilities, it is inevitable that things will go wrong.  If you’re at the coalface, you will need to think about how you will deal with the fallout. A useful approach is to offer to take the rap if things go wrong. On the other hand, if you’re a senior manager overseeing an initiative that has failed, look for learnings, not scapegoats.

Distinguish between wicked and tame elements of your initiative: some aspects of sociotechnical problems are wicked, others are straightforward (or tame). For example, in the case of the development centre, the wicked element was how to get started in a way that demonstrated value both to management and staff. The tame elements were the administrative issues: equipment, salary recharging etc (though, as it turned out, some of these had longer term wicked elements – a story to be told later perhaps).

Actively seek other points of view: Initially, I thought of the development centre in terms of a large monolithic affair. After talking to consultants and doing my own research, I realised there was another way.

Understand the need for different types of thinking: related to the above, it is helpful to surround yourself with people who think differently from you.

Consider long term consequences:  Although it is important to act (the second point made above), it is also important to think through the consequences of one’s actions, the possible scenarios that might result and how one will deal with them.

Act so as to increase your future choices: This principle is from my intellectual hero, Heinz von Foerster, who called it the ethical imperative (see the last line of this paper). Given that one is acting in a situation that is inherently uncertain (certainly the case when one is setting up a new sociotechnical capability), one should be careful to ensure that one’s actions do not inadvertently constrain future choices.

–x–

With some trepidation, we decided to go ahead with the first hire.

A few months later, my colleague was more than happy with how things were going and started telling others about it. Word got around the organisation; one developer became three, then five, then more. Soon I was receiving more enquiries and requests than our small makeshift arrangement could handle. We had to rent dedicated office space, fit it out etc, but that was no longer a problem because management saw that it made good business sense.

–x–

This was my first encounter with emergent design. There have been many others since – some successful, others less so.   However, the approach has never failed me outright because a) the cost of failure is small and b) learnings gained from failures inform future attempts.

Although there are no set formulas for emergent design, there are principles.  My aim in this piece was to describe a few that I have found useful across different domains and contexts. The key takeaway is that emergent design increases one’s chances of success because it eschews expert-driven approaches in favour of practices tailored to the culture of the organisation.

 As David Cavallo noted, “rather than having the one best way there can now be many possible ways. Rather than adapting one’s culture to the approach, one can adapt the approach to one’s culture.

–x–x–

Written by K

September 14, 2021 at 4:43 am

To think, to be, to act

leave a comment »

It would have been sometime in late 2013. I was in the midst of exploring the possibility of setting up an analytics development centre for a large, somewhat conservative organization. The location of the centre had yet to be determined, but it was clear it would be a continent and a world away from headquarters.

A senior IT executive from headquarters was visiting our subsidiary. I knew him quite well and we had a good working relationship. He frowned as he caught sight of me across our big open plan area and gestured that he wanted to talk.

Uh oh.

I nodded and walked over to a vacant meeting room on my side.  He followed shortly and closed the door behind him.

Brief pleasantries done, he got to the point. “What’s this I hear about a development centre? What the hell are you up to?”

–x–

Despite out best-laid plans, the lives of our projects and the projects of our lives tend to hinge on minor events that we have little control over. Robert Chia stresses this point in his book Strategy without Design:

“Ambitious strategic plans, the ‘big picture’ approach that seeks a lasting solution or competitive advantage through large-scale transformations, often end up undermining their own potential effectiveness because they overlook the fine details of everyday happenings at ‘ground zero’ level.

At one level we know this, yet we act out a large part of our personal and work lives as though this were not so.

–x–

In business (and life!) we are exhorted to think before doing. My boss tells me I need to think about my team’s workplan for next year; my wife tells me I need to think about the future. Thinking is at the center of our strategies, blueprints, plans – the things that supposedly propel our lives into an imagined future.  

In brief, we are exhorted to make detailed plans of what we are going to do; we are encouraged not to act without thinking.

As Descartes famously wrote, cogito ergo sum, our thinking establishes our being.

But is that really so?

–x–

Gregory Bateson noted the following in his book, Angels Fear:

There is a discrepancy of logical type between “think” and “be”. Descartes is trying to jump from the frying pan of thought, ideas, images, opinions, arguments etc., into the fire of existence and action. But that jump itself is unmapped. Between two such contrasting universes there can be no “ergo” – no totally self-evident link. There is no looking before leaping from “cogito” to “sum”.

The gap between our plans and reality is analogous to the gap between thought and action. There is ample advice on how to think but very little on how to act in difficult situations.

As Bateson wrote elsewhere:

What is lacking is a theory of action within large complex systems, where the active agent is himself a part and a product of the system.

He then goes on to say that Kant’s categorical imperative – “act so to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end and never as only a means – might provide a starting point for such a theory.”

So far, so unsurprising.

But in the very next line, Bateson says something truly intriguing:

It seems also that great teachers and therapists avoid all direct attempts to influence the action of others and, instead, try to provide the settings or contexts in which some (usually imperfectly specified) change may occur.

This line resonated deeply when I read it first because it spelt out something that I had learnt through experience but had not found the words to articulate.

–x–

In contentious discussions, it is difficult to change minds using facts and figures alone. Indeed, the current reluctance to be vaccinated against Covid is a case in point (see this article, for example).What one needs in such situations is to reframe the terms of the discussion. In the Covid case that might be to focus on relative risks in terms that people can understand rather than absolute numbers of people who have suffered serious side-effects of the vaccine.

In general, reframing is about changing the way in which people perceive the problematic issue.  The best way to describe how it works is via an example. Here’s one from Paul Watzlawick’s classic book on change

A police officer with a special ability for resolving sticky situations in unusual ways, often involving a disarming use of humour, was in the process of issuing a citation for a minor traffic violation when a hostile crowd began to gather around him. By the time he had given the offender his ticket, the mood of the crowd was ugly and the sergeant was not certain that he would be able to get back to the relative safety of his patrol car. It then occurred to him to announce in a loud voice: “You have just witnessed the issuance of a traffic ticket by a member of your Oakland Police Department” And while the bystanders were busy trying to fathom the deeper meaning of this all too obvious communique, he got into his cruiser and drove off.

The specifics of what one might do depends on the situation, but the general idea is to appreciate the situation from the viewpoint of the other party and act in a way that helps shift that perspective in an indirect or oblique manner.

This is one of the key principles of emergent design – and more about that in a forthcoming piece.

–x–

Back to the story I started with:

I realized instinctively that much hinged on what I said and – more importantly – how I said. My interlocutor was clearly upset, and I had to ensure that my words did not infuriate him further. He had the power to stop my fledgling project in its tracks with a word or two in the right ears.

“There is no plan to set up a development centre,” I said, looking him in the eye. “All we have done is hire a couple of people here to help with the workload at headquarters.”

“Who has requested help?”

I told him who. He knew that person well and thought highly of him.

“Where do you plan to go from here?” he demanded.

“Like I said, there is no plan. This is just a pilot to see if we can help improve productivity. The idea is to free people in headquarters so that they can focus on the strategic stuff.”

“Just make sure it doesn’t turn into something bigger.”

“Absolutely,” I responded, mustering what I hoped was a reassuring smile.

“OK,” he nodded and walked out. 

I breathed easier; he seemed to be OK with it for now. But even if not, the conversation was still open. More importantly, I had bought myself some time to pay greater attention to the politics of the project over the coming weeks.

–x–

It was only in retrospect that I realized that the interaction described here was pivotal to the success of the project. How so is a story to be told later. For now, the point I wish to make is that the projects of our lives can be planned down to great detail, but their outcomes are often determined by the unplanned micro-actions we take while doing them.

–x–x–

(no identity – courtesy HaPe Gera https://www.flickr.com/photos/hape_gera/2929195528)

Written by K

June 1, 2021 at 6:51 am

3 or 7, truth or trust

with one comment

“It is clear that ethics cannot be articulated.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein

Over the last few years I’ve been teaching and refining a series of lecture-workshops on Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Audiences include data scientists and mid-level managers working in corporates and public service agencies. The course is based on the distinction between uncertainties in which the variables are known and can be quantified versus those in which the variables are not known upfront and/or are hard to quantify.

Before going any further, it is worth explaining the distinction via a couple of examples:

An example of the first type of uncertainty is project estimation. A project has an associated time and cost, and although we don’t know what their values are upfront, we can estimate them if we have the right data.  The point to note is this: because such problems can be quantified, the human brain tends to deal with them in a logical manner.

In contrast, business strategy is an example of the second kind of uncertainty. Here we do not know what the key variables are upfront. Indeed we cannot, because different stakeholders will perceive different aspects of a strategy to be paramount depending on their interests – consider, for example, the perspective of a CFO versus that of a CMO. Because of these differences, one cannot make progress on such problems until agreement has been reached on what is important to the group as a whole.  The point to note here is that since such problems involve contentious issues, our reactions to them  tend to be emotional rather than logical.

The difference between the two types of uncertainty is best conveyed experientially, so I have a few in-class activities aimed at doing just that. One of them is an exercise I call “3 or 7“, in which I give students a sheet with the following printed on it:

Circle either the number 3 or 7 below depending on whether you want 3 marks or 7 marks added to your Assignment 2 final mark. Yes, this offer is for real, but there a catch: if more than 10% of the class select 7, no one gets anything.

Write your student ID on the paper so that Kailash can award you the marks. Needless to say, your choice will remain confidential, no one (but Kailash) will know what you have selected.

3              7

Prior to handing out the sheet, I tell them that they:

  • should sit far enough apart so that they can’t see what their neighbours choose,
  • are not allowed to communicate their choices to others until the entire class has turned their sheets.

Before reading any further you may want to think about what typically happens.

–x–

Many readers would have recognized this exercise as a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and, indeed, many students in my classes recognize this too.   Even so, there are always enough of “win at the cost of others” types in the room who ensure that I don’t have to award any extra marks. I’ve run the exercise about 10 times, often with groups comprised of highly collaborative individuals who work well together. Despite that,15-20% of the class ends up opting for 7.

It never fails to surprise me that, even in relatively close-knit groups, there are invariably a number of individuals who, if given a chance to gain at the expense of their colleagues, will not hesitate to do so providing their anonymity is ensured.

–x–

Conventional management thinking deems that any organisational activity involving several people has to be closely supervised. Underlying this view is the assumption that individuals involved in the activity will, if left unsupervised, make decisions based on self-interest rather than the common good (as happens in the prisoner’s dilemma game). This assumption finds justification in rational choice theory, which predicts that individuals will act in ways that maximise their personal benefit without any regard to the common good. This view is exemplified in 3 or 7 and, at a societal level, in the so-called Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals who have access to a common resource over-exploit it,  thus depleting the resource entirely.

Fortunately, such a scenario need not come to pass: the work of Elinor Ostrom, one of the 2009 Nobel prize winners for Economics, shows that, given the right conditions, groups can work towards the common good even if it means forgoing personal gains.

Classical economics assumes that individuals’ actions are driven by rational self-interest – i.e. the well-known “what’s in it for me” factor. Clearly, the group will achieve much better results as a whole if it were to exploit the resource in a cooperative way. There are several real-world examples where such cooperative behaviour has been successful in achieving outcomes for the common good (this paper touches on some). However, according to classical economic theory, such cooperative behaviour is simply not possible.

So the question is: what’s wrong with rational choice theory?  A couple of things, at least:

Firstly, implicit in rational choice theory is the assumption that individuals can figure out the best choice in any given situation.  This is obviously incorrect. As Ostrom has stated in one of her papers:

Because individuals are boundedly rational, they do not calculate a complete set of strategies for every situation they face. Few situations in life generate information about all potential actions that one can take, all outcomes that can be obtained, and all strategies that others can take.

Instead, they use heuristics (experienced-based methods), norms (value-based techniques) and rules (mutually agreed regulations) to arrive at “good enough” decisions.  Note that Ostrom makes a distinction between norms and rules, the former being implicit (unstated) rules, which are determined by the cultural attitudes and values)

Secondly, rational choice theory assumes that humans behave as self-centred, short-term maximisers. Such theories work in competitive situations such as the stock-market but not in situations in which collective action is called for, such as the prisoners dilemma.

Ostrom’s work essentially addresses the limitations of rational choice theory by outlining how individuals can work together to overcome self-interest.

–x–

In a paper entitled, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, published in 1998, Ostrom states that:

…much of our current public policy analysis is based on an assumption that rational individuals are helplessly trapped in social dilemmas from which they cannot extract themselves without inducement or sanctions applied from the outside. Many policies based on this assumption have been subject to major failure and have exacerbated the very problems they were intended to ameliorate. Policies based on the assumptions that individuals can learn how to devise well-tailored rules and cooperate conditionally when they participate in the design of institutions affecting them are more successful in the field…[Note:  see this book by Baland and Platteau, for example]

Since rational choice theory aims to maximise individual gain,  it does not work in situations that demand collective action – and Ostrom presents some very general evidence to back this claim.  More interesting than the refutation of rational choice theory, though, is Ostrom’s discussion of the ways in which individuals “trapped” in social dilemmas end up making the right choices. In particular she singles out two empirically grounded ways in which individuals work towards outcomes that are much better than those offered by rational choice theory. These are:

Communication: In the rational view, communication makes no difference to the outcome.  That is, even if individuals make promises and commitments to each other (through communication), they will invariably break these for the sake of personal gain …or so the theory goes. In real life, however, it has been found that opportunities for communication significantly raise the cooperation rate in collective efforts (see this paper abstract or this one, for example). Moreover, research shows that face-to-face is far superior to any other form of communication, and that the main benefit achieved through communication is exchanging mutual commitment (“I promise to do this if you’ll promise to do that”) and increasing trust between individuals. It is interesting that the main role of communication is to enhance or reinforce the relationship between individuals rather than to transfer information.  This is in line with the interactional theory of communication.

Innovative Governance:  Communication by itself may not be enough; there must be consequences for those who break promises and commitments. Accordingly, cooperation can be encouraged by implementing mutually accepted rules for individual conduct, and imposing sanctions on those who violate them. This effectively amounts to designing and implementing novel governance structures for the activity. Note that this must be done by the group; rules thrust upon the group by an external authority are unlikely to work.

Of course, these factors do not come into play in artificially constrained and time-bound scenarios like 3 or 7.  In such situations, there is no opportunity or time to communicate or set up governance structures. What is clear, even from the simple 3 or 7 exercise,  is that these are required even for groups that appear to be close-knit.

Ostrom also identifies three core relationships that promote cooperation. These are:

Reciprocity: this refers to a family of strategies that are based on the expectation that people will respond to each other in kind – i.e. that they will do unto others as others do unto them.  In group situations, reciprocity can be a very effective means to promote and sustain cooperative behaviour.

Reputation: This refers to the general view of others towards a person. As such, reputation is a part of how others perceive a person, so it forms a part of the identity of the person in question. In situations demanding collective action, people might make judgements on a person’s reliability and trustworthiness based on his or her reputation.’

Trust: Trust refers to expectations regarding others’ responses in situations where one has to act before others. And if you think about it, everything else in Ostrom’s framework is ultimately aimed at engendering or – if that doesn’t work – enforcing trust.

–x—

In an article on ethics and second-order cybernetics, Heinz von Foerster tells the following story:

I have a dear friend who grew up in Marrakech. The house of his family stood on the street that divide the Jewish and the Arabic quarter. As a boy he played with all the others, listened to what they thought and said, and learned of their fundamentally different views. When I asked him once, “Who was right?” he said, “They are both right.”

“But this cannot be,” I argued from an Aristotelian platform, “Only one of them can have the truth!”

“The problem is not truth,” he answered, “The problem is trust.”

For me, that last line summarises the lesson implicit in the admittedly artificial scenario of 3 or 7. In our search for facts and decision-making frameworks we forget the simple truth that in many real-life dilemmas they matter less than we think. Facts and  frameworks cannot help us decide on ambiguous matters in which the outcome depends on what other people do.  In such cases the problem is not truth; the problem is trust.  From your own experience it should be evident it is impossible convince others of your trustworthiness by assertion, the only way to do so is by behaving in a trustworthy way. That is, by behaving ethically rather than talking about it, a point that is squarely missed by so-called business ethics classes.

Yes,  it is clear that ethics cannot be articulated.

Notes:

  1. Portions of this article are lightly edited sections from a 2009 article that I wrote on Ostrom’s work and its relevance to project management.
  2.  Finally, an unrelated but important matter for which I seek your support for a common good: I’m taking on the 7 Bridges Walk to help those affected by cancer. Please donate via my 7 Bridges fundraising page if you can . Every dollar counts; all funds raised will help Cancer Council work towards the vision of a cancer free future.

Written by K

September 18, 2019 at 8:28 pm

%d bloggers like this: