Archive for November 2010
In a recent post entitled, Why Best Practices Are Hard to Practice, Ron Ashkenas mentions two common pitfalls that organisations encounter when implementing best practices. These are:
- Lack of adaptation: this refers to a situation in which best practices are applied without customizing them to an organisation’s specific needs.
- Lack or adoption: this to the tendency of best practice initiatives to fizzle out due to lack of adoption in the day-to-day work of an organisation.
Neither point is new: several practitioners and academics have commented on the importance adaptation and adoption in best practice implementations (see this article from 1997, for example). Despite this, organisations continue to struggle when implementing best practices, which suggests a deeper problem. In this post, I explore the possibility that problems of adaptation and adoption arise because much of the knowledge relevant to best practices is tacit – it cannot be codified or captured via symbolic systems (such as writing) or speech. This “missing” tacit knowledge makes it difficult to adapt and adopt practices in a meaningful way. All is not lost, though: best practices can be useful as long as they are viewed as templates or starting points for discussion, rather than detailed prescriptions that are to be imitated uncritically.
The importance of tacit knowledge
Michael Polanyi’s aphorism – “We can know more than we can tell’ – summarises the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge : the former refers to what we can “tell” (write down, or capture in some symbolic form) whereas the latter are the things we know but cannot explain to others via writing or speech alone.
The key point is: tacit knowledge is more relevant to best practices than its explicit counterpart.
“Why?” I hear you ask.
Short Answer: Explicit knowledge is a commodity that can be bought and sold, tacit knowledge isn’t. Hence it is the latter that gives organisations their unique characteristics and competencies.
For a longer answer, I’ll quote from a highly-cited paper by Maskell and Malmberg entitled, Localised Learning and Industrial Competitiveness:
It is a logical and interesting – though sometimes overlooked – consequence of the present development towards a knowledge-based economy, that the easier codified (tradeable) knowledge is accessed, the more significant becomes tacit knowledge for sustaining the heterogeneity of the firm’s resources. If all factors of production, all organisational blue-prints, all market-information and all production technologies were readily available in all parts of the world at (more or less) the same price, economic progress would dwindle. Resource heterogeneity is the very foundation for building firm specific competencies and thus for variations between firms in their competitiveness. Resource heterogeneity fuels the market process of selection between competing firms
Tacit knowledge thus confers a critical advantage on firms. It is precisely this knowledge that distinguishes firms from each other and sets the “best” (however one might choose to define that) apart from the rest. It is the knowledge that best practices purport to capture, but can’t.
Transferring tacit knowledge
The transfer of tacit knowledge is an iterative and incremental process: apprentices learn by practice, by refining their skills over time. Such learning requires close interaction between the teacher and the taught. Communication technology can obviate the need for some face-to-face interaction but he fact remains that proximity is important for effective transfer of tacit knowledge. In the words of Maskell and Malmberg:
The interactive character of learning processes will in itself introduce geographical space as a necessary dimension to take into account. Modern communications technology will admittedly allow more of long distance interaction than was previously possible. Still, certain types of information and knowledge exchange continue to require regular and direct face-to-face contact. Put simply, the more tacit the knowledge involved, the more important is spatial proximity between the actors taking part in the exchange. The proximity argument is twofold. First, it is related to the time geography of individuals. Everything else being equal, interactive collaboration will be less costly and more smooth, the shorter the distance between the participants. The second dimension is related to proximity in a social and cultural sense. To communicate tacit knowledge will normally require a high degree of mutual trust and understanding, which in turn is related not only to language but also to shared values and ‘culture’.
The main point to take away from their argument is that proximity is important for effective transfer of tacit knowledge. The individuals involved need to be near each other geographically (shared space, face-to-face) and culturally (shared values and norms). By implication, this is also the only way to transfer best practice knowledge.
Best practices, by definition, aim to capture knowledge that enables successful organizations be what they are. As we have seen above, much of this knowledge is tacit: it is context and history dependent, and requires physical/cultural proximity for effective transfer. Further, it is hard to extract, codify and transfer such knowledge in a way that makes sense outside its original setting. In light of this, it is easy to understand why adapting and adopting best practices is hard: it is hard because best practices are incomplete – they omit important elements (the tacit bits that can’t be written down). Organisations have to (re)discover these in their own way. The explicit and (re-discovered) tacit elements then need to be integrated into new workplace practices that are necessarily different from standardised best practices. This makes the new practices unique to the implementing organisation.
The above suggests that best practices should be seen as starting points – or “bare bones” templates – for transforming an organisation’s work practices. I have made this point in an earlier post in which I reviewed this paper by Jonathan Wareham and Hans Cerrits. Quoting from that post:
[Wareham and Cerrits] suggest an expanded view of best practices which includes things such as:
- Using best practices as guides for learning new technologies or new ways of working.
- Using best practices to generate creative insight into how business processes work in practice.
- Using best practices as a guide for change – that is, following the high-level steps, but not necessarily the detailed prescriptions.
These are indeed sensible and reasonable statements. However, they are much weaker than the usual hyperbole-laden claims that accompany best practices.
The other important implication of the above is that successful adoption of organisational practices is possible only with the active involvement of front-line employees. “Active” is the operative word here, signifying involvement and participation. One of the best ways to get involvement is to seek and act on employee opinions about their day-to-day work practices. Best practices can serve as templates for these discussions. Participation can be facilitated through the use of collective deliberation techniques such as dialogue mapping.
Best practices have long been plagued by problems of adaptation and adoption. The basic reason for this is that much of the knowledge pertaining to practices is tacit and cannot be transferred easily. Successful implementation requires that organisations use best practices as templates to build on rather than prescriptions to be followed to the letter. A good way to start this process is through participatory design discussions aimed at filling in the (tacit) gaps. These discussions should be conducted in a way that invites involvement of all relevant stakeholders, especially those who will work with and be responsible for the practices. Such an inclusive approach ensures that the practices will be adapted to suit the organisation’s needs. Further, it improves the odds of adoption because it incorporates the viewpoints of the most important stakeholders at the outset.
Paul Culmsee and I are currently working on a book that describes such an approach that goes “beyond best practices”. See this post for an excerpt from the book (and this one for a rather nice mock-up cover!)
The Abilene paradox refers to a situation in which a group of people make a collective decision that is counter to the preferences or interests of everyone in the group. The paradox was first described by Jerry Harvey, via a story that is summarised nicely in the Wikipedia article on the topic. I reproduce the story verbatim below:
On a hot afternoon in Coleman, Texas, the family is comfortably playing dominoes on a porch, until the father-in-law suggests that they take a trip to Abilene [53 miles north] for dinner. The wife says, “Sounds like a great idea.” The husband, despite having reservations because the drive is long and hot, thinks that his preferences must be out-of-step with the group and says, “Sounds good to me. I just hope your mother wants to go.” The mother-in-law then says, “Of course I want to go. I haven’t been to Abilene in a long time.”
The drive is hot, dusty, and long. When they arrive at the cafeteria, the food is as bad as the drive. They arrive back home four hours later, exhausted.
One of them dishonestly says, “It was a great trip, wasn’t it?” The mother-in-law says that, actually, she would rather have stayed home, but went along since the other three were so enthusiastic. The husband says, “I wasn’t delighted to be doing what we were doing. I only went to satisfy the rest of you.” The wife says, “I just went along to keep you happy. I would have had to be crazy to want to go out in the heat like that.” The father-in-law then says that he only suggested it because he thought the others might be bored.
The group sits back, perplexed that they together decided to take a trip which none of them wanted. They each would have preferred to sit comfortably, but did not admit to it when they still had time to enjoy the afternoon.
Harvey contends that variants of this story play out over and over again in corporate environments. As he states in this paper, organizations frequently take actions in contradiction to what they really want to do and therefore defeat the very purposes they are trying to achieve.
The Abilene paradox is essentially a consequence of the failure to achieve a shared understanding of a problem before deciding on a solution. A case in point is Nokia’s ill-judged restructuring circa 2003, initiated in response to the rapidly changing mobile phone market.
Prior to the restructure, Nokia was a product-oriented company that focused on developing one or two new phone models per year. Then, as quoted by an employee in an article published in Helsingin Sanomat (A Finnish daily), Nokia management deemed that: “Two new models a year was no longer enough, but there was a perceived need to bring out as many as 40 or 50 models a year… An utterly terrifying number.” Company management knew that it would be impossible to churn out so many models under the old, product-focused structure. So they decided to reorganise the company into different divisions comprising of teams dedicated to creating standard components (such as cameras), the idea being that standard components could be mixed-and-matched into several “new” phone models every year .
The restructuring and its consequences are described in this article as follows:
[The] re-organisation split Nokia’s all-conquering mobile phones division into three units. The architect was Jorma Ollila, Nokia’s most successful ever CEO, and a popular figure – who steered the company from crisis in 1992 to market leadership in mobile phones – and who as chairman oversaw the ousting of Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo this year [i.e 2010].
In Ollila’s reshuffle, Nokia made a transition from an agile, highly reactive product-focused company to one that managed a matrix, or portfolio. The phone division was split into three: Multimedia, Enterprise and Phones, and the divisions were encouraged to compete for staff and resources. The first Nokia made very few products to a very high standard. But after the reshuffle, which took effect on 1 January 2004, the in-fighting became entrenched, and the company being increasingly bureaucratic. The results were pure Dilbert material.
That the Nokia restructure was possibly a “trip to Abilene” is suggested by the following excerpt from an interview with a long-time Nokia employee (see part IV of the Helsingin Salomat article):
…Even CEO Jorma Ollila was less than enthusiastic about the heavy organisational structure, and recognised perfectly well that it was making Nokia stiff and sluggish in its movements. In their time, Ollila’s views made it all the way down to the factory floor.
But was it not Jorma Ollila himself who created the organisation he led?
“Yes”, replies the woman.
Ollila’s unwavering line was to allow his subordinates freedom, to trust them without tight controls. In this way the then leaders of the business units like Mobile Phones and Multimedia could recruit whom they wanted. And in so doing the number of managers at all levels mushroomed to enormous proportions and the product development channels became clogged…
Management actions aimed at shoring up and boosting Nokia’s market share ended up achieving just the opposite, and the irony is that the restructure did not even have the whole-hearted support of management.
Like the Nokia restructuring effort, most projects are initiated in response to a perceived problem. Often times, those responsible for giving the project the go-ahead do not have an adequate appreciation of the problem or the proposed solution. As I have stated in an earlier post:
Many high profile projects fail because they succeed. This paradoxical statement is true because many projects are ill-conceived efforts directed at achieving goals that have little value or relevance to their host organisations. Project management focuses on ensuring that the project goals are achieved in an efficient manner. The goals themselves are often “handed down from above”, so the relevance or appropriateness of these is “out of scope” for the discipline of project management. Yet, the prevalence of projects of dubious value suggests that more attention needs to be paid to “front-end” decision making in projects – that is, decision making in the early stages, in which the initiative is just an idea.
Front-end decisions are difficult because they have to be made on the basis of ambiguous or incomplete information. This makes it all the more important that such decisions incorporate the honest views and opinions of all stakeholders in the organisation (or their nominated representatives). The first step in such a process is to ensure that all stakeholders have a common understanding of the goals of the project – i.e. what needs to be done. The next is to reach a shared understanding of how those goals will be achieved. Such stakeholder alignment can be facilitated through communication-centric, collaborative techniques such as dialogue mapping. Genuine dialogue is the only way to prevent pointless peregrinations to places that an organisation can ill-afford to go to.